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Brexit, Ireland and the WTO: Possible Policy Options for a 
Future UK-Australia Agri-food Trade Agreement 
 
Alan Swinbank 
University of Reading 
Abstract 
Prior to the United Kingdom’s accession to the then European Economic 
Community (EEC), in 1973, Australia was a significant supplier of Britain’s 
food. Membership of the EU resulted in trade diversion, closing the British 
market to Australian sugar for example. This paper questions whether the 
UK’s exit from the EU (“Brexit”) might usher in a new agri-food trade regime, 
restoring Australian farmers’ access to the British market, or whether other 
opposing political economy considerations might prevail. Would the UK 
unilaterally adopt free trade? Can a comprehensive Free Trade Area (FTA) 
agreement between Australia and the UK, including agri-food products, be 
negotiated? Any new relationship will need to reflect the UK Government’s 
stated preference for a frictionless border with EU27 (particularly on the 
island of Ireland), the WTO rule-book, and the interests of the UK’s farm 
lobbies, as well as the UK’s quest for ‘free trade’ with the wider international 
community. 
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Summary at a glance: Trade in agricultural goods will be affected by Brexit 
(the UK’s departure from the European Union) particularly over the UK’s 
border with the Republic of Ireland, and potentially raises new trading 
possibilities for Australia. 
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As we leave the European Union, we will negotiate a new, comprehensive, 
bold and ambitious free trade agreement with the EU, but we will also seize 
the exciting opportunities to strike deals with old friends and new partners. 
At this summit [the G20 in Hamburg], I held a number of meetings with 
other world leaders, all of whom made clear their strong desire to forge 
ambitious new bilateral trading relationships with the UK after Brexit. This 
included America, Japan, China and India. This morning, I welcomed 
Australian Prime Minister Turnbull to Downing Street, where he also 
reiterated his desire for a bold new trading relationship. Theresa May, 
House of Commons, 10 July 2017. 
 
Introduction 
As a result of a referendum on its membership of the European Union (EU) 
on 23 June 2016, in which 51.9% of votes caste were to leave the EU and 
48.1% to remain, on a turnout of 72.7% (The Electoral Commission, 2016), 
the United Kingdom (UK) is set to leave the EU (“Brexit”), possibly as early 
as 11pm (British time) on 29 March 2019. Quite what this will mean for the 
UK’s future trade relations with the EU, and the rest of the world, is yet to 
be determined. This paper focuses on the political economy constraints, 
and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, that will influence the 
outcome, particularly with regard to trade in agricultural commodities and 
food and drink products (see also Swinbank, 2017a & Swinbank, 2017b), 
and on the quest for a Free Trade Area (FTA) with Australia. 
Two issues are highlighted. First, that although the EU’s common 
agricultural policy (CAP) has undergone a number of reforms since the 
1990s, and consequently is rather less trade distorting than the “old” CAP 
of the 1970s and 80s (Swinbank & Daugbjerg, 2017), it is still characterised 
by excessively high tariffs on a number of products: on beef, butter and 
cheese, and sugar for example. Second, that a rather critical border 
between a post-Brexit UK and the remaining members of the EU (referred 
to as EU27 in this paper) is the one on the island of Ireland dividing the 
Republic of Ireland from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
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Ireland. How to keep that border open, and not to return to The Troublesi of 
the past, is a major concern. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 sets the scene by recalling 
the impact on Australian agriculture of the UK’s accession to the European 
Economic Community (EEC).ii Section 2 outlines changes to the CAP, 
prompted in large part by international pressure in the Uruguay Round. 
These changes did not however extend to subsequent reductions in 
agricultural tariffs. Section 3 discusses some of the difficulties the UK is 
encountering in attempting to redefine its post-Brexit trade relations with 
EU27, emphasising in particular the high import tariffs that are still 
charged on many CAP products and the difficulties this might cause for 
agri-food trade over the Irish border. With these constraints in mind, 
Section 4 asks what sort of agri-food trade deal for Australia, if any, might 
emerge; whilst Section 5 concludes. 
 
1: 1973 and Accession of the UK to the EEC 
The United Kingdom’s accession to the EEC in 1973  —and a phased 
harmonisation of the UK’s farm support and agricultural tariffs with those 
of the EEC which was to be completed on 1 January 1978—  led to 
considerable trade diversion. Prior to accession, the UK had been a major 
market for Australia’s agricultural exports, but for several products these 
export opportunities were closed, as illustrated in Table 1. Whilst New 
Zealand obtained concessions on butter, and for a limited period for cheese 
(Lodge, 1982), no similar arrangements were put in place for other 
developed countries. The developing country suppliers of raw cane sugar 
under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, for refining in the UK, were 
accommodated, but not Australia (Webb, 1977).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 Zeros do not dominate the last column of Table 1 because of trade 
concessions negotiated with the EU. In the Tokyo Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
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and Trade (GATT), launched in 1973 and concluded in 1979, Australia (and 
others) had obtained Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) enabling it sell limited 
quantities of beef and cheese to the EU without paying the EU’s full 
variable import levy. With the introduction of a common support policy for 
sheepmeat in 1980 New Zealand had negotiated a Voluntary Restraint 
Agreement (in effect a TRQ) with the EU, with the arrangements later 
extended to Australia and others, reducing the EU’s tariff from 20% to, 
eventually, 0% on these supplies. In the Uruguay Round these TRQs were 
incorporated into the EU’s Schedule of Commitments.iii Quite how a post-
Brexit UK, and EU27, will share, or otherwise assume responsibility for 
these TRQs is as yet unknown (and is not explored in this paper). 
Australia’s discontent with the EEC, and in particular with its CAP, 
has been widely documented (e.g. Benvenuti, 1999, Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, 1985). In March 1978 for example, Vic Garland, then Minister 
for Special Trade Representations, claimed: ‘Australia is the country worst 
affected by the enlargement of the EEC and its common agricultural policy’. 
In his view, the EEC was denying Australia ‘the opportunity, the right, to 
compete in its markets. Worse, the EEC is disposing of the surpluses 
caused by its policies at heavily subsidised prices on third markets in 
which we would otherwise sell our products.’ 
 
2: The Uruguay Round and CAP Reform 
Although highly critical of the CAP, and strongly supportive of the USA’s 
opening stance in the Tokyo Round on liberalising trade in agricultural 
products, Australia itself had limited leverage in that it was willing to offer 
little by way of easier access for industrial products onto its markets. Up to 
that time Australia had intervened extensively in its economy  —but much 
more so in the manufacturing sector than in agriculture. Thus it suffered a 
‘credibility gap in its campaign for fairer and freer trade in agriculture’ 
(Capling, 2001: 93). In the face of a steadfast European defence of its 
agricultural policy, in 1977 the Americans agreed to delink the 
negotiations on agriculture from those on industrial tariffs, allowing the 
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Tokyo Round to be concluded without significant progress on agriculture 
(Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2009: 78-9). 
The election of a Labor government in 1983 led to a fundamental 
reappraisal of Australian policy, including financial deregulation, floating 
the currency, and ‘dramatic unilateral tariff reductions’ in 1988 and 1991 
(Capling, 2001: 96). Nonetheless, some farm sectors continued to receive 
support into the 1980s. Thus dual pricing systems (under which Australian 
consumers paid higher prices than those earned from exports) raised 
farm-gate prices for some products, including sugar cane and milk, ‘by 
significant amounts’, and in 1986-87 a large deficiency payment was made 
to wheat producers (Mauldon, 1990: 310).  
In the early 1980s, prior to the launch of the Uruguay Round at 
Punta del Este in September 1986, Australian officials developed ‘an 
imaginative new approach to multilateral diplomacy’ (Capling, 2001: 105). 
Australia emerged as a staunch advocate of free trade, and assisted in the 
formation, in August 1986, of the Cairns Group of likeminded ‘fair traders’ 
determined to play an active part in the forthcoming negotiations. 
Nonetheless, as Kenyon and Lee (2006: 73) concede, ‘the extent to which 
members of the Cairns Group protected domestic agriculture, and their 
willingness to reform domestic support policies, varied significantly’. 
It was, however, the USA and the EU that dominated the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. Scholars will no doubt continue to debate the causal 
factors that led to the inclusion of an Agreement on Agriculture in the 
package of agreements concluded in Marrakesh in 1994, and the extent to 
which these negotiations prompted the EU, in 1992, to undertake its first 
significant reform of its CAP (the MacSharry Reform). But the US and EU’s 
resolve that the whole Uruguay Round package had to be treated as a 
Single Undertaking, explicitly linking the agricultural negotiations to 
progress in other dossiers, was probably a decisive factor (Daugbjerg & 
Swinbank, 2009: 90-3). 
In a series of ‘reforms’, beginning with that of 1992, the EU has 
made significant changes to the CAP (Swinbank & Daugbjerg, 2017). 
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Despite this the CAP’s core raison d'être remains that of supporting farm 
incomes, however imperfectly defined or targeted. And one defining 
element of the “old” CAP remains in place. Following the initial, and 
limited, reductions in import tariffs negotiated in the Uruguay Round, no 
significant MFN (most-favoured-nation) tariff reductions have 
subsequently been implemented. CAP reform has embraced domestic 
support provisions, but has not extended to tariff reductions.iv At one stage 
in the Doha Round negotiations it did seem possible that the higher tariffs 
could be reduced by up to 70% (WTO, 2008), but with the Round in the 
doldrums that prospect appears to have been lost. Consequently MFN 
tariffs on a number of products (dairy, red meats, sugar, for example) 
remain prohibitively high, as illustrated later in this text, and imports are 
only possible under concessional terms (Swinbank, 2017b).  
WTO rules provide for three systems of concessional access. First, 
WTO Members can discriminate in favour of developing countries, 
provided they do so on a MFN basis. Thus, under its Everything but Arms 
(EBA) scheme, the EU offers duty and quota free access for products 
originating within the Least-developed Countries (LDCs), giving access for 
example for sugar and rice to the EU’s protected market. Second, as noted 
above, in the Uruguay Round various country-specific TRQs were 
incorporated within the Schedules of Commitments of various WTO 
members, including the EU; but these give Australia rather limited access 
to the EU market (Hussey & Tidemann, 2017: 104-6). Third, and of 
particular relevance to this paper, GATT Article XXIV allows WTO members 
to form Free Trade Areas (FTAs) and Customs Unions, within which 
products can move freely (although for FTAs this relates only to 
originating products, necessitating potentially complex rules of origin). In 
Section 3 the paper considers the prospects for future UK-EU27 trade 
relations, whilst Section 4 assesses the aspirations of Australia’s agri-food 
sector for a UK-Australia FTA. 
 
3: Post-Brexit UK-EU27 Trade Relations 
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Although the UK triggered Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union on 
29 March 2017  —implying that the UK will leave the EU in March 2019 
unless other arrangements are negotiated—  very little is yet known about 
the measures that will govern trade between the UK and EU27 following 
Brexit.  
 By December 2017 it was more-or-less agreed by the EU27’s 
negotiator and the British Government  —but not yet formally ratified by 
treaty—  that there was a need for a transition period (although the British 
preferred to refer to an implementation period) of about two years to 
avoid a ‘cliff-edge’ scenario in March 2019. During this transition, EU law 
(e.g the CAP) would continue to apply in the UK, the UK would be bound by 
the EU’s trade agreements with Third Countries (i.e. no scope for 
implementing an Australia-UK FTA in that period), and the UK would have 
no say in EU decision making (Joint Report, 2017). A new UK-EU27 trade 
agreement, to apply from the end of the transition period, could then be 
negotiated. 
 It is still possible that the UK will exit the EU  —either by accident 
or design—  without an alterative UK-EU27 trade pact in place (some 
commentators, depending on their political persuasion, talk of a ‘hard’ 
Brexit, others of a ‘clean’ Brexit). The Article 50 negotiations did not start 
well, and there is no guarantee that they can be concluded successfully. 
Indeed, in the past, the British Government has said that ‘no deal for the UK 
is better than a bad deal for the UK’ (HM Government, 2017a: 65). 
Moreover, hard-core Brexiteers remain adamant that a clean break is 
required, and was mandated by the referendum result. A number of 
prominent economists support this stance (see Economists for Free Trade, 
2017). Given the fluid and fervid nature of current UK politics, such an 
outcome cannot be discounted. Under such circumstances trade between 
the UK and EU27 would be regulated by WTO rules; but the UK would be 
free to unilaterally reduce its MFN tariffs (i.e. pursue free, or freer, trade) 
and/or negotiate FTAs with low cost agricultural producers such as 
Australia. 
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 The UK Government has consistently said that, although exiting the 
EU means leaving both the Customs Union and Single Market (see Box 1), it 
is seeking ‘a new customs arrangement that facilitates the freest and most 
frictionless trade possible in goods between the UK and the EU’ (HM 
Government, 2017b: 2). That document talked about ‘aligning our 
approach to the customs border in a way that removes the need for a UK-
EU customs border’; and of implementing ‘technology-based solutions to 
make it easier to comply with customs procedures’ (p. 2).v  
 
Box 1: The EU’s Customs Union and Single Market 
GATT Article XXIV insists that, to be valid, members of a customs union 
must ensure that ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce … 
are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories of the union’ (my emphasis), and that ‘substantially 
the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of 
the members of the union to the trade of territories not included in the 
union’. In this regard the EU might be characterised as a perfect customs 
union in that it covers all trade between EU states, and a common external 
tariff applies on third country imports. In contrast the customs union 
between the EU and Turkey is only partial in that it does not include 
agricultural products.  
      Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) can also restrict trade. Although some 
regulatory convergence between Turkey and the EU has been agreed, 
Turkey is not part of the EU’s Single Market. 
      The Single (or Internal) Market is based on EU law rather that WTO 
agreements. In seeking to achieve the free movement of goods  —one of 
the ‘four freedoms’ for goods, services, capital and workers—  the same 
regulatory regime applies in all the Member States, or the principle of 
mutual recognition results in products legally produced in one Member 
State being accepted throughout the Single Market. With its Customs Union 
covering all goods, and regulatory harmonisation or equivalence achieved 
in its Single Market, there is no need to apply border controls on goods 
within the EU. Once the EU’s common external tariff has been paid, imports 
from third countries are in free circulation in the EU. 
      Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, as members of the European 
Economic Area (EEA), are part of the EU’s Single Market (but not of the 
Customs Union), and consequently have to accept and apply relevant 
regulatory provisions adopted by the EU. They have Free Trade Area (FTA) 
agreements with the EU, rather than customs unions. Moreover, these FTA 
provisions do not extend to agriculture, and Norway et al. do not apply the 
CAP. Many of the EU’s other FTAs  —for example the Comprehensive 
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Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada—  do 
not have full coverage of agricultural products. 
     Both FTAs and customs unions are governed by GATT Article XXIV. 
Collectively they are referred to as Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) by 
the WTO. FTAs differ from customs unions in that only products produced 
within the FTA benefit from the “free” trading provisions, and partners can 
maintain their own trade barriers against third country products, 
necessitating complex rules of origin. The WTO also oversees Preferential 
Trade Arrangements (PTAs)  —such as a Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP)—  which are not reciprocal: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm  
 
Both sides in the Article 50 negotiations are insistent that the one land 
border between EU27 and the UK  —straddling the island of Ireland—  is 
of critical importance. With regard to this complex issue, paragraph 49 of 
the Joint Report (2017) said:  
‘The United Kingdom remains committed to protecting North-South cooperation [between 
the two jurisdictions on the island of Ireland] and to its guarantee of avoiding a hard 
border. Any future arrangements must be compatible with these overarching 
requirements. The United Kingdom's intention is to achieve these objectives through the 
overall EU-UK relationship. Should this not be possible, the United Kingdom will propose 
specific solutions to address the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland. In the 
absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom will maintain full alignment with those 
rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, support 
North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the 1998 [Good 
Friday or Belfast] Agreement.’ 
 Agriculture, and the EU’s past failure to complete reform of its CAP, 
present particular difficulties in this regard (Swinbank, 2017b). MFN tariffs 
on red meats, dairy products, and sugar, are particularly high, as already 
mentioned above and now illustrated in Table 2. This is not to suggest that 
EU prices exceed world market prices by these amounts. There is 
considerable “water” in many of these MFN tariffs, and EU market prices 
often approximate world levels. But they are the tariffs that EU27 would be 
obliged to apply on imports from the UK in the absence of a FTA linking 
EU27 and the UK, as under WTO rules (GATT Article I) EU27 could not 
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treat imports from the UK more favourably than imports from any other 
WTO Member, and vice versa. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Sugar presents a particularly stark example. Ireland no longer 
produces sugar. Instead it imports sugar (for both direct consumption and 
manufacturing purposes) from other EU Member States. The EU’s import 
regime is particularly complex, with a number of preferential access 
schemes (see for example Agbenyegah & Frawley, 2017: 72-5). This 
complexity of course extends to processed products containing sugar on 
which comparably high MFN tariffs apply. The limited imports of sugar 
into the EU under preferential schemes consist largely of raw cane-sugar 
for refining, with the UK the main import destination. Australia has access 
to a small country-specific TRQ, and so its sales of sugar to the EU are very 
limited. 
If the UK and EU27 fail to agree a FTA that includes agriculture, and 
revert to MFN tariffs, then trade in many agri-food products across the 
Irish border would be abruptly disrupted Alternative scenarios are 
conceivable, but  —in my judgement—  highly unlikely: a) The EU 
significantly reduces its MFN tariffs on CAP products abating the 
difficulties envisaged in this text; b) Northern Ireland leaves the UK and 
unites with the Republic of Ireland within the EU; c) Ireland leaves the EU 
and aligns its trade with UK agricultural policy as was the case prior to 
1973; or d) Northern Ireland becomes a separate customs territory within 
the UK, aligning its farm tariffs with those of the EU, and necessitating 
customs controls within the UK between the island of Ireland and Great 
Britain. The latter corresponds to a rather contentious proposal the EU27’s 
negotiator advanced on 28 February 2018 in suggesting that, in the 
absence of alternative solutions to keep the border open, it might be 
necessary for Northern Ireland to remain within the EU Customs Union, 
and continue to apply the EU’s sanitary and phytosanitary rules ‘on the 
production and marketing of agricultural and fisheries products’ 
(European Commission, 2018: 101). However, this would seem to be a 
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non-starter, as the UK Government has said it is implacably opposed to any 
proposal that would fracture the UK’s own internal market. 
If prohibitively high MFN tariffs on many CAP products are to apply 
to EU imports from the UK, then shipments from the North of Ireland to the 
South would almost certainly cease, whereas the outcome for South-North 
trade would depend on the UK’s trade policy stance: the UK could, for 
example unilaterally reduce the MFN tariffs it applies on one or more 
products. Currently large volumes of agricultural produce and processed 
products criss-cross this border as part of complex supply chains.vi  
 Even if the EU and EU27 negotiate a FTA that includes these goods, 
it is difficult to believe that Ireland, or the EU farm lobby, would be willing 
to accept free importation of sugar (and sugar-containing products) from a 
post-Brexit UK, or for that matter beef or other highly protected CAP 
products, except under very strict circumstances. Pre-notification of 
shipments for customs clearance, vehicle number-plate recognition 
technology, etc., might eliminate the need for a physical border  —although 
EU sources have poured scorn on this idea—  but shipments would still 
face a virtual border at which traders would need to demonstrate that the 
goods respected rules of origin, pay the appropriate tariff that might apply, 
and satisfy any regulatory requirements (sanitary and phytosanitary rules 
for example).  
 When the two parties to a FTA apply similar, and modest, tariffs on 
imports from third countries, trade deflection is less likely to be important, 
and so rules of origin can perhaps be dispensed with. But when one of the 
two parties (the EU say) imposes high tariffs on a particular product (e.g. 
sugar) then trade deflection is likely to become a real threat. Under these 
circumstances restrictive rules of origin would almost certainly be 
rigorously applied, to ensure the sugar had originated in the UK. But trade 
deflection can extend to product substitution. The EU would not want to 
import sugar produced from sugar beet grown in the UK, for example, if 
the bulk of supplies for the UK’s domestic consumption was derived from 
imported raw cane sugar, displacing British grown product onto the EU27 
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market. As foreshadowed in the Joint Report of December 2017, EU27 
might insist that the UK applies similar, if not the same, trade regime on 
third country imports. 
 Consequently the UK Government’s stated objective of achieving ‘a 
new customs arrangement that facilitates the freest and most frictionless 
trade possible in goods between the UK and the EU’, particularly for agri-
food products over the Irish border, could conceivably result in the EU 
demanding that the UK retains trade restrictions on CAP products 
comparable to those currently applied, as well as shadowing the EU’s 
regulatory measures.vii Under these circumstances the UK would not be at 
liberty to adopt a free (or freer) trade stance, or negotiate its own FTAs 
with low cost agricultural suppliers such as Brazil or Australia. Although 
notionally free of the EU’s Customs Union and Single Market, and its CAP, 
the UK would have in place similar trade barriers and would have become, 
in effect, a satellite state of the EU: indeed some members of the British 
Parliament have talked about the UK becoming a vassal state. As a satellite 
state  —having still to apply the CAP’s trade barriers—  it would be unable 
to strike its own agri-food trade deals around the world, or unilaterally 
reduce its tariffs.  
The other extreme is a ‘hard’ (‘clean’) Brexit. With this outcome the 
UK might have no formal trade links with EU27, other than those 
contingent on WTO membership. Under these circumstances UK agri-food 
exports to EU27 would face the EU’s prohibitively high MFN tariffs, and a 
correspondingly ‘hard’ border would be in place on the island of Ireland, 
rupturing existing North-South trade links with consequential damage to 
the agriculture, food and drink industries on both sides of the border.  
A ‘hard’ Brexit could result in a number of trade scenarios. In one 
extreme outcome the UK might unilaterally opt for free trade, offering 
duty- and quota-free access to all WTO suppliers, including EU27, without 
obtaining reciprocal admittance. This might be contrasted with a situation 
in which the UK adopts a protectionist stance, sheltering its agriculture 
behind the tariffs on CAP products inherited from its EU membership, 
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whilst entering no new trade partnerships with either EU27 or other WTO 
Members.viii Between these two extremes one might imagine: i) the UK 
negotiating a single FTA, with Australia for example, offering that country 
significant preferential access to its protected food markets; through ii) 
multiple FTAs  —with Australia, Brazil, the USA for example—  in which 
the margin of preference for each of its FTA partners would be reduced; to 
iii) numerous FTAs with virtually all potential suppliers, in which the 
impact on UK food supplies and prices would be barely different from 
unilateral free trade. 
Other variants can also be envisaged including exclusion of certain 
products (e.g. beef) from FTAs or with TRQ limits on their access; and 
partial or selected reductions in MFN tariffs. Quite where in this policy 
space the UK will end up is far from clear, and the uncertain outcome may 
well take a decade or more to emerge. 
 
4: Agri-food Trade and a UK-Australia FTA? 
Brexit provides an unprecedented opportunity for the Australian red meat 
industry to enhance its trading relationship with the UK. Meat & Livestock 
Australia 
Securing duty free access for Australian raw cane sugar in the forthcoming 
trade discussions with the UK will provide opportunity for UK refiners to 
access increased quantities of Australian raw sugar on competitive terms. It 
will also enable Australian exporters to renew and develop commercial 
trading arrangements with the UK’s sugar refiners. Establishing this 
environment will create good opportunities to grow Australia’s raw sugar 
trade with the UK once it has exited the EU. The Australian Sugar Industry 
Alliance 
 
As noted above, Meat & Livestock Australia (2017), The Australian Sugar 
Industry Alliance (2017), and various other agri-food industry groups, in 
evidence to the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2017), have expressed optimism that Brexit will provide their 
industries with an opportunity to expand sales to the UK. Bearing in mind 
the discussion in Section 3 above, how likely is this?  
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It is not just the need to avoid disrupting trade between a post-
Brexit UK and EU27  —including agri-food products over the Irish 
border—  that suggests an outcome nearer the ‘soft’ Brexit in which the UK 
becomes a satellite state of EU27. Other political economy considerations 
also point to a UK agricultural sector retaining considerable border 
protection against other WTO suppliers.  
The nation is divided geographically, with the devolved 
administrations in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland more wedded to 
the idea of supporting farmers than is the central government based in 
Westminster and Whitehall (Swinbank, 2015). Farmers in these regions 
are more heavily dependent on extensive livestock production (beef and 
sheep), for example, than are the majority of farms in England: products 
that will likely prove uncompetitive in a global open-trading marketplace. 
As agricultural policy is a devolved responsibility (Keating, 2018), 
“common frameworks” will be need to, inter alia: ‘enable the functioning of 
the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy divergence; ensure 
compliance with international obligations; [and] ensure the UK can 
negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements and 
international treaties’ (Defra, 2018: 59). As with Australia’s 
Commonwealth and State governments, it is the United Kingdom that has 
WTO membership. The UK government in London is negotiating with 
EU27, and post-Brexit it will have responsibility for determining import 
tariffs, negotiating trade agreements (e.g. FTAs with EU27 and Australia), 
and ensuring the UK meets its WTO obligations under, for example, the 
Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures. How much influence the devolved 
administrations can bring to bear on these policy decisions remains to be 
seen. 
In England many Conservative MPs serve rural constituencies and, 
although the farm vote is small, the farm lobby can draw on significant 
sympathies. If support is to be withdrawn it is more likely to be the rather 
more visible taxpayer-funded payments to farmers that would be 
 15 
eliminated, releasing money for electorally popular projects such as 
environmental protection and enhancement (Defra, 2018), or the National 
Health Service, rather than the much less visible support provided by 
border protection. Abolition of the latter would deliver no (direct) cash 
bonanza for the public finances. 
What then of Australia’s agri-food trade prospects in the event of a 
hard/clean Brexit? Sugar can again be taken as a case in point. 
If: i) the UK negotiates a FTA with Australia, that includes sugar, but 
ii) fails to do so with other competitive suppliers such as Brazil, and iii) 
maintains its current MFN tariffs, then Australia will have a clear 
competitive advantage in the UK market (despite duty and quota free 
access for the rather higher-cost LDC and EPA suppliers). If the UK also 
negotiates a FTA with Brazil, then Brazilian cane sugar (and ethanol), with 
shorter (and cheaper) transport links to the UK, may well hold a 
competitive advantage over Australian supplies. Finally, if the UK goes for 
free trade on all agri-food products, including refined sugar, then it may 
well end up importing refined sugar from EU27 in competition with raw 
cane sugars from around the world, and what remains of its own sugar 
beet processing industry. In short, the devil lies in the detail. 
In negotiating its own FTA with Australia, EU27 will presumably be 
mindful of any likely EU27-UK and UK-Australia FTAs that might be 
negotiated, and what their cumulative impact might be. For example, if 
EU28 had been willing to offer Australia a duty-free TRQ of x thousand 
tonnes of sugar, EU27 might now offer a duty-free TRQ of (x – y) thousand 
tonnes in the expectation that the UK will offer Australia y thousand 
tonnes.  
In seeking to negotiate an EU-Australia FTA we might confidentially 
predict that one of the EU’s offensive interests in the agri-food domain will 
be enhanced protection on Australian markets for the EU’s extensive list of 
products bearing Geographical Indications of Origin (GIs), as it has done in 
FTA agreements with other nations (Moir, 2017). For example, in its 
submission to the EU Member States for opening negotiations with 
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Australia, the European Commission (2017c: 7) said: ‘The Agreement 
should provide direct protection through the agreement of a list of GIs 
(wines, spirits, agricultural products and foodstuffs), at a high level of 
protection …, including …, enhanced enforcement, co-existence with “bona 
fide” prior trademarks, protection against subsequent genericness [sic] and 
the possibility to add new GIs.’ 
It is less easy to imagine what the UK’s offensive interest over agri-
food trade in a future FTA with Australia might be, which would enable it 
to present the overall package as advantageous for the UK’s farm, food and 
drink industries. There are some small tariffs on processed foods imported 
into Australia that could be eliminated with some advantages for UK-based 
firms but, unlike their European counterparts, the UK has never been an 
enthusiastic advocate of GIs. In a recent Consultation paper the British 
Government has said: ‘we have a golden opportunity to help our farmers to 
grow more, sell more and export more great British food, building on our 
high quality brand. British food and farming has a world-class reputation 
for quality’ (Defra, 2018: 61). But it is not clear why a FTA with Australia 
would be particularly helpful in this regard. 
 
5: Concluding Comments 
If the UK and EU27 do agree on a transition period of about two years, in 
effect extending the UK’s de facto membership of the EU’s customs union, 
the UK will not be free to enter into new trading agreements with other 
partners until 2021. For the present UK Government, however, committed 
as it is to Brexit, there is a strong political imperative to conclude FTAs as 
quickly as possible, and certainly before the next General Election 
scheduled for 2022, to demonstrate to the British electorate the success of 
its policies. Australia, as a like-minded Commonwealth country, with a 
liberal trade regime and high product standards, is likely to be a priority 
candidate, despite its small market in comparison to other, more 
challenging, FTA candidates such as the USA, Brazil, India and China. But 
unless the UK is willing to forego protecting its farm sector, an Australia-
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UK FTA that fully embraces agriculture faces considerable opposition in 
the UK, not least over the future status of the Irish border. 
 If the UK adopts the advice of the Economists for Free Trade, opting 
unilaterally for free trade, there will be interesting (perhaps profound) 
implications for the UK’s economy and patterns of trade, but whether 
Australian agriculture will emerge as a major supplier of the UK’s food and 
drink is a more open question, well beyond the scope of the present paper. 
The situation in the late 2010s is quite different to that of the late 1960s. 
No longer is the UK the obvious outlet for Australian trade. Australia has 
newer, closer, and more dynamic markets in Asia-Pacific, and would no 
longer benefit from Commonwealth Preferences in a free trade UK. 
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Table 1: Australian Exports of Selected Agricultural Products to the 
EU10 
 1967-68 
1,000 t 
1971-72 
1,000 t 
1977-78 
1,000 t 
1982-83p 
1,000 t 
Beef & veal 25.7 42.7 17.6 8.9 
Sheepmeat 12.1 63.8 5.5 15.5 
Wheat 805.0 833.0 66.5 0.0 
Barley 7.0 613.0 161.0 0.0 
Sugar 400.0 528.0 28.6 0.0 
Butter 57.1 11.2 2.7 0.3 
Cheese 18.5 4.4 1.5 3.1 
Apples & pears 119.4 84.9 40.6 10.1 
Canned deciduous 
fruit 
123.0 71.2 28.6 29.7 
Dried vine fruit 39.9 26.1 15.0 27.0 
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Economics (1985: 333) 
Original data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Australian Meat and 
Livestock Corporation 
p = preliminary data at the time 
Greece became a member of the EU in January 1981 
 
 
Table 2: The EU’s MFN tariffs on selected products and their support 
prices under the CAP 
 MFN tariff 
per tonne 
CAP support price 
per tonne 
Beef carcass, fresh or chilled 12.8% plus €1,768 €2,224 
Butter €1,896 €2,463.9 
White sugar €419 €404.4 
During 2017 the average value of the euro (€) was AUS$1.4732, within the range 1.3689 - 
1.5693. 
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End Notes 
                                                        
i https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Troubles  
ii The EEC evolved into today’s European Union (EU). This paper refers to 
either the EEC or the EU as seems more appropriate, rather than attempting 
to precisely document evolving institutional arrangements and terminology. 
iii The latest certified true copy of the modifications and rectifications to this 
schedule is dated 1 December 2016 (WTO, 2016). On 6 October 2017 the EU 
submitted a revised schedule to include modifications and rectifications 
consequent upon Croatia’s accession to the EU, and to reflect the WTO 
decision to eliminate export subsidies on agricultural goods (European 
Commission, 2017b). 
iv This is perhaps an unintended consequence. Under the pre-Uruguay Round 
system of variable import levies, a reduction in EU support prices (including 
its minimum import  —threshold—  prices) would have led to a levy 
reduction. 
v For example: ‘bilateral implementation of a technology-based solution for 
roll-on, roll-off ports which could consist of pre-arrival notification of 
consignments on a port IT system, linked to customs declarations and vehicle 
registration numbers so that vehicles were not required to stop at the border, 
enabling traffic to flow smoothly’ (HM Government, 2017b: 9). 
vi As HM Government (2017c: 13) notes: ‘When considering cross-border 
trade, it is particularly important to note the integrated nature of the agri-
food sector. Food, beverages and tobacco account for 49 per cent of cross-
border manufacturing trade, with, for example, more than 10,000 pigs 
exported from Ireland to Northern Ireland every week and a quarter of all 
milk produced on Northern Ireland’s farms exported for processing in 
Ireland’ (footnotes omitted). 
vii It might be noted that the EU has insisted that a post-Brexit UK should put 
in place domestic legislation providing for the continued protection of 
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existing Geographical Indications of Origin (GIs) ‘comparable to that 
provided by Union law’ (European Commission, 2017a). 
viii The UK has said that it ‘will maintain current access for the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) to UK markets and aim to maintain the 
preferential access of the remaining (non-LDC) developing countries, 
including those countries with which we have Economic Partnership 
Agreements’ (HM Government, 2017b: 5). The EU has negotiated Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) states that had preferential access to EU markets through the Lomé 
and then Cotonou Conventions. 
